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Comment
Illinois' Weakened Attempt to Prevent False
Confessions by Juveniles: The Requirement of
Counsel for the Interrogations of Some Juveniles
Jennifer J. Walters*

[W]e are told that this boy was advised of his constitutional rights
before he signed the confession and that, knowing them, he nevertheless
confessed. That assumes, however that a boy of fifteen, without aid of
counsel, would have a full appreciation of that advice and that on the
facts of this record had a freedom of choice. We cannot indulge those
assumptions. Moreover, we cannot give any weight to recitals which
merely formalize constitutional requirements. Formulas of respect for
constitutional safeguards cannot prevail over the facts of life which
contradict them.
-Justice Douglas in Haley v. Ohio.1
I. INTRODUCTION

In Chicago, Illinois, fifteen-year-old Eddie Huggins confessed to
stabbing a woman to death, and the State charged him as an adult for
murder, despite the fact that the victim had no knife wounds. 2 Huggins
claimed that he did not understand what the police officers said to him
at the time he confessed.3 He spent sixteen months in a juvenile

* J.D. expected May 2002. 1 would like to thank Paul Holland and Kate Walz for pointing
me in the right direction. I also want to express my appreciation for the suggestions and support
offered by the members of the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal.
1. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948) (plurality opinion); see infra Part II.B (discussing
the facts and holding of the Supreme Court's decision in Haley).
2. Maurice Possley & Steve Mills, Little Adds Up in Murder Case; Youth Admits Stabbing,
Autopsy Shows No Knife Wounds, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 21, 1999, § 1, at 1, available at 1999 WL
2855525. Instead of a stabbing, the victim died as a result of strangulation. Mike Robinson,
String Of Blunders Raises Questions About Chicago Cops, ST. J.-REG., May 30, 1999, at 19,
available at 1999 WL 16229668.
3. Possley & Mills, supra note 2. The facts of the Huggins case suggest circumstances by
which a false confession is made and accepted in court. Id. Huggins said that the police officers
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detention center before the charges were dropped. 4 Similarly, sixteenyear-old Don Olmetti confessed to the murder and robbery of a teacher,
and the State charged him as an adult with first-degree murder and
armed robbery. 5 According to his lawyer, the police interrogated
Olmetti for eighteen hours and during that time prevented him from
having any contact with his parents. 6 He spent two years in jail before
prosecutors dropped the charges because attendance records and
statements from teachers proved that Olmetti was in school at the time
of the crime.7 Finally, seventeen-year-old Mario Hayes confessed to the
murder of a homeless man, but his first trial ended in a mistrial after the
jury was deadlocked.8 After Cook County Jail officers testified in his
second trial that Hayes was in jail at the time of the murder, the jury
9
found Hayes not guilty.

ignored his denials and threatened him. Id. He also claimed that he was intoxicated during the
interrogation, and that the officers told him that he committed the murder. Id. His mother
indicated that he had been diagnosed as hyperactive, and Huggins said that "after a while" he
"stopped hearing" the police officers. Id. Huggins signed a confession after hours of questioning
at four o'clock in the morning. Id. According to his mother, Huggins was balled up on the floor
when she went into the interrogation room after he confessed. Id. He said to her, "Momma, I
don't know what they're saying." Id.
The facts also demonstrate how it can take a considerable amount of time and contradictory
evidence before a confession is recognized as false. Id. Huggins' lawyer did not question a
single witness within the first four months after Huggins was charged, and he did not challenge
the validity of the confession in this time. Id. Blood from the victim was found on the witness
who implicated Huggins. Id. In his confession, Huggins stated that he placed a bloody sweater
he wore during the murder in a garbage can, but police did not find the sweater in a search right
after the interrogation. Id.
4. Editorial, Eddie Huggins Finally Goes Free, CHI. TRIB., May 1, 1999, § 1, at 26, available
at 1999 WL 2868875.
5. James Hill, Youth Jailedfor 2 Years Goes Home, CHI. TRIB., May 21, 1999, § 2, at 1,
available at 1999 WL 2875614; Annie Sweeney, Student Chargedin Teacher Slaying; Police Say
16-Year-Old Killed to Steal Just $4, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 4, 1997, § 2, at 1, available at 1997 WL
3535241.
6. Hill, supra note 5. Olmetti was diagnosed as "borderline mentally retarded." Id. The
police held him for eighteen hours, and Olmetti stated that the police "beat me down" and "made
me sign" the confession. Id. According to his lawyer, his parents tried to see Olmetti three times
while he was being questioned, but officers did not let them have any contact with their son.
Diane Struzzi, Murder Case Dropped, Teen Still Held; Questions Remain 2 Years After Arrest,
CHI. TRIB., May 18, 1999, § 2, at 1, available at 1999 WL 2874342.
7. Struzzi, supra note 6.
8. James Hill, Evidence in Murder Case Too Flawed to Suit Jury, CHI. TRIB., June 8, 1999, §
2, at 1, available at 1999 WL 2881088; Cathryn E. Stewart & G. Flint Taylor, Law and Order,
California-Style; Look West, Cook County, Look West, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 1, 2000, § 1, at 19,
available at 2000 WL 3640911. Hayes claims that investigators coerced him to confess. Hill,
supra.
9. Hill, supra note 8.
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Statistics cannot adequately reflect the number of false confessions
given by juveniles in the United States.' ° Because evidence does not
always exist to conclusively establish the innocence of a coerced
11
person, the veracity of the confession will often remain in dispute.
According to one study, however, almost a dozen juveniles in the
United States confessed to murder during a two-year period, and
subsequent evidence eventually proved their innocence. 2 Although
both adults and children make false confessions, recently publicized
cases demonstrate that juveniles are more susceptible to falsely
confessing. 13 A false confession by a juvenile can have grave
14
consequences because confessions do not receive much scrutiny.
15
Instead, a confession by a defendant carries considerable weight.
According to experts on false confessions, seventy-three percent of false
confessions led to convictions even when evidence clearly pointed to
the innocence of the defendant, or when the only evidence of guilt was
the confession. 16 As a result, juveniles who falsely confess may suffer
punishment for crimes that they did not commit. 17

10. Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions:
Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriagesof Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation,88
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429,431-32 (1998).
11. Id. at 429-30.
12. 20/20: A Child's Confession (ABC television broadcast, June 18, 1999), availableat 1999
WL 6790763 [hereinafter 20/201; see, e.g., infra note 149 (citing examples of false confessions by
juveniles).
13. See supra notes 2-9 and infra notes 18, 149 and accompanying text (describing recent
cases of false confessions by juveniles).
14. Jonathan Eig, Making Them Talk, CHI. MAG., Jan. 1999, at 52, 53.
15. WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE 36 (Saundra D. Westervelt &
John A. Humphrey eds., 2001); Eig, supra note 14, at 53. Prosecutors acknowledge that a
confession is the "single most powerful tool for putting away criminals." But see Arizona v.
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) (holding, nevertheless, that the improper admission of a
confession should be subject to harmless error analysis rather than requiring automatic reversal).
The Court noted that "a defendant's confession is 'probably the most probative and damaging
evidence that can be admitted against him."' Id. at 292 (quoting Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S.
186, 195 (1987) (White, J., dissenting)); see also Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The
Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and IrrationalAction, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 979
(1997). According to Ofshe and Leo:
A confession-whether true or false-is arguably the most damaging evidence the
government can present in a trial. As a result, when police elicit a false confession,
they are likely to cause the wrongful conviction and imprisonment of an innocent
person. Someone who confesses is presumed guilty and treated more harshly by every
criminal justice official and at every stage of the trial process.
Id. at 983-84.
16. Amy Bach, True Crime, False Confession, NATION, Feb. 8, 1999, at 22, availableat 1999
WL 9306862; see also Leo & Ofshe, supra note 10, at 484. Confession experts Richard Ofshe
and Richard Leo examined sixty cases in which there was a confession and evidence that strongly
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After a seven and an eight-year-old falsely confessed to the murder of
eleven-year-old Ryan Harris, 18 Illinois lawmakers recognized that
during a police interrogation, children need greater protection than
simply being read their Miranda rights. 19 Lawmakers, therefore, passed
section 405/5-170, a law that requires that a child under the age of
thirteen suspected of committing a murder or a sexual assault be
represented by a lawyer during the entire police interrogation. 20 An
earlier version of the law required the presence of counsel for the
interrogation of anyone under seventeen suspected of committing any
crime. 2 1 In addition, the first proposal sought to exclude from evidence
any confession obtained without the consultation of a lawyer. 22 Section
405/5-170, as it was eventually enacted, however, contains no remedies
for confessions obtained in violation of the statute.23 The changes to the
legislation, as originally proposed, clearly diminish the number of
contradicted the confession. Id. at 436. Seventy-three percent of these cases that went to trial
resulted in a conviction. Id. at 484.
17. Ofshe & Leo, supra note 15, at 984.
18. Eig, supra note 14, at 52. Eleven-year-old Ryan Harris was found dead on July 28, 1998
in weeds in Englewood, a south side neighborhood in Chicago. Rosalind Rossi & Brenda Warner
Rotzoll, Boys' Ordeal Leaves Searing Questions, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sept. 6, 1998, at 8, available
at 1998 WL 5596629. She had been beaten and suffocated with her underwear, which was
stuffed into her mouth, and she had been sexually molested with an object. Id. Relatives of the
victim told police officers that they saw some boys throw rocks at Ryan a few days before she
was murdered. DeNeen L. Brown, The Accused; For Two Little Boys, Wrongful Murder Charges
Could Stick for Life, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 1998, at FOI, available at 1998 WL 16565875.
Detectives questioned individually, without the presence of their parents or lawyers, two boys
who were seven and eight years old. Lorraine Forte & John Carpenter, Why 2 Boys Stand
Accused of Murder, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 30, 1998, at 8, available at 1998 WL 5595683.
During the questioning, the boys said that they had thrown rocks at Harris causing her to fall off
her bicycle. Rossi & Rotzoll, supra. They also admitted putting her underwear in her mouth.
Brown, supra. Officers arrested the boys and filed murder charges against them. Lorraine Forte
et al., "Confessions" By Boys Put Heat on Cops, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 16, 1998, at 4, available
at 1998 WL 5593812. Despite the fact that Harris was considerably larger than the boys, and that
four neighbors said that on the day she was murdered they saw Harris with a man, police officers
were "certain" that they had the killers. Brown, supra; Forte & Carpenter, supra. When semen
was found on the underwear about a month after they were charged, it became clear that the boys
had not committed the murder because boys at their age do not produce semen. Eig, supra note
14, at 52. The charges were dismissed, but the boys never received an apology from police
officers or the City of Chicago. Brown, supra. According to their lawyer, the boys have been
"deeply damaged" by the experience. Eig, supra note 14, at 133.
19. See infra Part II.E (discussing how Miranda does not afford juveniles adequate
protection).
20. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-160 (2001), amended by P.A. 92-16 § 87 (codified as
amended at 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-170).
21. S.B. 730, 91st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (I11.2000), amended by House Amendment 1.
22. H.B. 3674, 91st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (I11.2000).
23. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-160 (2001), amended by P.A. 92-16 § 87 (codified as
amended at 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-170).
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juveniles who will benefit from this new procedural safeguard, and the
limitations placed on the enacted legislation will affect whether the
legislature achieves its goal of preventing false confessions by
24
juveniles.
This Comment will first examine the development of federal
constitutional law regarding the privilege against self-incrimination and
the right to counsel during an interrogation.2 5 Next, Part II will analyze
the development of juvenile courts and the application of procedural
safeguards to the juvenile justice system including the recognition of
juveniles' Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 26 Part
II will then discuss how Illinois and other states approach the
admissibility of confessions by juveniles. 27 Finally, Part II will explore
factors, which lead to false confessions by juveniles. 28 Part III of this
Comment will trace the legislative history and intent of section 405/5170, which requires a lawyer's presence during the interrogations of
certain minors. 29 Part IV will critique the ways in which that statute
30
addresses the problem of false confessions by juveniles in Illinois.
Finally, Part V will propose that the statute be amended to apply to
more juveniles as a better means of achieving the statute's purported
31
goal-to reduce false confessions by juveniles.
II. BACKGROUND

Over the past century, the treatment of juvenile interrogations was
32
altered because of fundamental changes in the juvenile justice system.
Some of the changes reflect an idea that the interrogations of children
33
should be conducted with more care than the interrogations of adults.
This idea is well supported by empirical studies as well as other

24. See infra Part IV.B (analyzing the shortcomings to the enacted legislation).
25. See infra Part I1.A (explaining how a suspect has and must be informed of both the right to
counsel and the privilege against self-incrimination during an interrogation).
26. See infra Part II.B (tracing the development of juvenile courts and the application of
procedural safeguards to juvenile justice).
27. See infra Part II.C-D (describing Illinois' use of a totality of the circumstances test and
other states' per se rules concerning juvenile statements).
28. See infra Part .E (identifying factors that contribute to false confessions by juveniles).
29. See infra Part llI.A-B (tracing the development of section 405/5-170).
30. See infra Part IV.A-B (analyzing the benefits and shortcomings of section 405/5-170).
31. See infra Part V (arguing for changes to section 405/5-170 and new procedures to protect
juveniles during interrogations).
32. See infra Part II.A-D (tracing the development of interrogation law, juvenile courts, and
juvenile interrogation law).
33. See infra Part II.B (describing Supreme Court cases holding that juveniles need more
protection during interrogations).
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evidence concerning the effect of interrogation techniques on children. 34
While other states have set up per se rules to offer more protection to
juveniles during interrogations, 35 courts in Illinois currently apply a
totality of the circumstances test, 36 the same test applied to adults, to
37
determine the voluntariness of a juvenile's confession.
A. Development of InterrogationLaw
A combination of provisions in the Constitution and decisions by the
United States Supreme Court offer some protection to suspects during
interrogations. Under the Fifth Amendment, a person shall not "be
38
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.
Under the Sixth Amendment, an accused has a right to "the Assistance
of Counsel for his defence." 39 The Court held that the privilege against
self-incrimination and the right to counsel apply to a suspect being
interrogated. n Statements that are coerced or made after a request for
counsel are considered involuntary and inadmissible in court. 4 1 To
ensure that an interrogated suspect has an opportunity to exercise the
privilege against self-incrimination and the right to counsel, the
Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona 42 created procedural safeguards
to inform suspects of their rights. 43 After finding that a custodial
interrogation is inherently coercive, 44 the Court decided that a suspect
must be apprised of his or her rights to ensure that a confession is the

34. See infra Part II.E (pointing out reasons that juveniles are more susceptible to false
confessions).
35. See infra Part II.D (explaining rules set up by other states to protect juveniles during
interrogations).
36. See infra Part II.C (discussing Illinois courts' use of the totality of the circumstance test).
37. See infra Part H.C (detailing Illinois' treatment of statements by juveniles).
38. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. Vi.
40. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964) (holding that denying a suspect's
request for counsel during an interrogation violates the Sixth Amendment); Bram v. United
States, 168 U.S. 532, 543 (1897) (articulating that pretrial interrogations are covered by the Fifth
Amendment).
41. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 155
(1944) (holding that a conviction cannot stand where it rests on a coerced confession).
42. Miranda,384 U.S. at 436.
43. Id. at 444. The Supreme Court held that police officers must explicitly instruct suspects in
custodial interrogations that they have the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney. Id.
The suspect must be told that anything said can be used against him or her in court and that a
lawyer can be appointed if the suspect cannot afford one. Id.
44. Id. at 458. The Court reviewed widely-used interrogation practices, which it found
psychologically coercive, and it decided that there is "compulsion inherent in custodial
surroundings." Id.; see also infra Part H.E.2 (explaining some of these interrogation techniques).
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result of free choice.4 5 While a person can still waive his or her Fifth
and Sixth Amendment rights, the state retains the burden of showing
that a person knowingly and intelligently waived those rights. 4 6 To
determine whether a defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver,
the Court instructed that the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation be considered.4 7 As the suspects involved in Miranda
were adults, the Court did not address whether juveniles are capable of
knowingly and intelligently waiving their rights.48
B. The Evolution of the Juvenile Justice System
Because juveniles differ from adults in important ways, 49 courts often
treat juveniles differently than adults.5 ° In fact, an entire court system
was established over a hundred years ago to handle juveniles suspected
of committing crimes or being victimized by abuse or neglect. 51 The
founders of this system relied on the principle of parens patriae in
creating the courts. 52 Under the theory of parens patriae, the State acts
as a surrogate parent to delinquent juveniles. 53 Through informal
hearings, the founders wanted juvenile courts to offer assistance to
delinquent minors. 54 The juveniles were to be rehabilitated instead of

45. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457-58. To respond to the inherent compulsion, the Court found that
a suspect must be "adequately and effectively apprised of his rights." Id. at 467.
46. Id. at 475.
47. Id. at 476. This consideration is known as the "totality of the circumstances test." Fare v.
Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979).
48. However, some states explicitly extended the requirement to juveniles by statute. JOHN C.
WATKINS, JR., THE JUVENILE JUSTICE CENTURY: A SOCIOLEGAL COMMENTARY ON AMERICAN
JUVENILE COURTS 119-20 (1998). Illinois courts decided that the Mirandarequirements apply to
juveniles. People v. Horton, 261 N.E.2d 693, 697 (I11.App. Ct. 1970).
49. Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental
Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 156-57 (1997).
Studies have found that children are less cognitively competent than adults, and they are
influenced differently than adults by psychosocial factors such as peer influence, more inclination
towards risk, and a different temporal perspective. Id. All of these factors affect their ability to
make decisions. Id.
50. WATKINS, supra note 48, at 40. The founders of the juvenile court system relied on neoclassical criminology theory. Id. This theory holds that some people such as children are not
capable of "rationally calculat[ing] pain and pleasure," and therefore, they are not blameworthy.
Id. Because children are not blameworthy, justice is not served by punishing them. Id.
51. Id. at 43. The first court was set up in Chicago, Illinois in 1899. Id.
52. Sanford J. Fox, The Early History of the Court, THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Winter 1996,
at 32. Patens patriae literally means "parent of the country," and the phrase is used to reflect the
role of the State to act as guardian to those with disabilities or an inability to care for themselves,
including juveniles. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).
53. Fox, supra note 52, at 32.
54. Id. at 33-34.
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merely punished.55 Because the founders of the juvenile court believed
that assistance was in the best interest of the minor, they considered
procedural safeguards unnecessary. 56 The founders also believed that
judges and probation officers would adequately protect children and that
the involvement of lawyers or strict rules would hinder the process of
assisting delinquent children. 57 It quickly became clear, however, that
the lack of procedural safeguards interfered with the goal of protecting
58
children.
Despite the fact that juvenile courts were designed to be informal to
protect children, the United States Supreme Court implicitly decided,
within decades of the creation of the juvenile courts, that juveniles
needed the protection offered by the formalities of due process. 59 The
Court reached this conclusion in Haley v. Ohio60 and Gallegos v.
Colorado6 I by holding that the interrogations of teenagers must comport
with the requirements of due process. The facts in these cases
illustrated that a lack of procedural safeguards is often not in the best
interest of the minor. 62 Not only did the Court find that constitutional
procedural safeguards apply to juveniles through these cases but it also
determined that the age of the child is relevant when considering
63
whether the safeguards are effective.
In Haley, the Court found that the confession by a fifteen-year-old
was involuntary, and, thus, its admission into evidence violated his right
to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. 64 Through an
examination of the facts, the Court found evidence of coercion during
the interrogation. 65 The defendant confessed to a murder after five
55. Charles F. Scott, Delinquency and Due Process: A Review of Illinois Law, 59 CHI.-KENT
L. REv. 123, 123 (1982).
56. WATKINS, supra note 48, at 47. In some juvenile courts, juveniles were "denied a specific
charge, appointment of counsel or advice that [they had] a right to counsel, the privilege against
self-incrimination, or the right to be advised of the privilege, confrontation, trial by jury, the
defense of double jeopardy, the right to make a complete record, and appeal." Joel F. Handler,
The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of Function and Form, 1965 WIS. L.
REv. 7, 16.
57. WATKINS, supra note 48, at 48-49.
58. See infra notes 59-79 and accompanying text (explaining Supreme Court's condemnation
of the lack of due process in juvenile cases).
59. See infra notes 72, 77-79 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's
holdings in cases where due process was lacking).
60. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (plurality opinion).
61. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
62. See infra notes 64-79 and accompanying text (describing the facts in Haley and Gallegos).
63. Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 54; Haley, 332 U.S. at 599 (plurality opinion).
64. Haley, 332 U.S. at 599 (plurality opinion).
65. Id. at 599-600 (plurality opinion).
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hours of interrogation. 66 Justice Douglas, writing for the plurality,
explained that the defendant, at age fifteen, was "an easy victim of the
law," and, therefore, special care was necessary to decide whether the
confession was voluntary. 67 The Court noted that the defendant was not
able to talk to his mother 68 and that the questioning by different teams
of police officers occurred from midnight to five o'clock in the
morning. 69 Even though the defendant's confession form instructed him
that he had a right to counsel, the Court stated it could not be assumed
that the defendant had a full appreciation of this right. 70 The Court was
suspicious of the police conduct during the private interrogation based
on the facts revealed about the police conduct towards the defendant
before and after the interrogation. 71 In light of the defendant's age, the
timing and length of the interrogation, the absence of counsel or a
friend, and the police conduct, the Court concluded that the law could
72
not sanction the methods employed in this interrogation.
Almost fifteen years later, the Court reaffirmed its requirement that
the interrogations of juveniles receive special care to ensure their right
66. Id. at 598 (plurality opinion). A candy store had been robbed, and its owner was shot and
killed. Id. at 597 (plurality opinion). According to the State's theory, the defendant acted as a
lookout. Id. (plurality opinion). The defendant confessed soon after the police presented him
with two "alleged" confessions by his two co-defendants. Id. at 598 (plurality opinion).
67. Id. at 599 (plurality opinion). While the Court gave special attention to the age of the
defendant, the Court suggested that "what transpired would make us pause for careful inquiry if a
mature man were involved." Id. (plurality opinion). However, the Court was concerned with the
defendant's age because "age 15 is a tender and difficult age," and at that age the defendant could
be overwhelmed by something which would not impress an older person. Id. (plurality opinion).
68. Id. at 600 (plurality opinion). The Court found this lack of contact to be especially
troublesome. See id. (plurality opinion).
69. Id. (plurality opinion). Evidence also indicated that the defendant was beaten by police
officers. Id. at 597 (plurality opinion). The defendant testified that he had been beaten during his
interrogation, and his mother testified that she noticed he was bruised and skinned when she first
saw him days after he was arrested. Id. (plurality opinion). She also testified that clothes the
defendant wore when he was arrested were torn and blood-stained. Id. (plurality opinion).
Because the police denied that the defendant was beaten, however, the Court did not consider the
possibility of physical coercion in making its decision. Id. at 597-98 (plurality opinion).
70. Id. at 601 (plurality opinion); see supra text accompanying note I (quoting Justice
Douglas' argument that "facts of life" may negate formalistic respect of constitutional rights).
71. Haley, 332 U.S. at 600 (plurality opinion). The defendant's mother hired a lawyer who, in
addition to his mother, attempted to see him twice. Id. (plurality opinion). The police did not
provide the lawyer or the mother an opportunity to speak with the defendant until five days after
he was arrested. Id. (plurality opinion). The Court characterized the police as having "a callous
attitude towards the safeguards which respect for ordinary standards of human relationships
compels." Id. (plurality opinion). Based on the evidence of this attitude, the Court stated: "When
the police are so unmindful of these basic standards of conduct in their public dealings, their
secret treatment of a 15-year-old boy behind closed doors in the dead of night becomes darkly
suspicious." Id. (plurality opinion).
72. Id. at 600-01 (plurality opinion).
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to due process is protected. 73 In Gallegos, 74 the Court focused on the
inequality between the police officers and the fourteen-year-old
defendant in holding that the police interrogation violated the
defendant's right to due process. 75 After his arrest, the defendant was in
custody for five days before he confessed to a murder. 76 During this
five day period, the defendant was not provided an opportunity to see a
parent or lawyer. 77 The Court held that the defendant did not know and
was not able to assert his constitutional rights because of his age and the
inequality between the defendant and the police officers. 78 According
his age as irrelevant would disregard his
to the Court, to dismiss
79
constitutional rights.
While Haley and Gallegos established that juveniles have due
process rights, 80 the Court did not articulate specific rights until it
decided In re Gault in 1967.81 Gault involved a fifteen-year-old boy
who was sentenced to an industrial school for up to six years for making
a lewd telephone call.82 The defendant was not informed he had a right
to a lawyer for his delinquency hearing, or that he had a privilege
against self-incrimination. 83 In addition, there was no recording or

73. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
74. Id. The defendant and another juvenile were accused of robbing and assaulting an elderly
man, who eventually died from the attack. Id. at 49-50.
75. Id. at 54-55.
76. Id. at 50.
77. Id. As in Haley, the defendant's mother attempted to see him but was told by police
officers that visiting hours were on other days. Id.
78. Id. at 54-55. Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas explained that "we deal with a person
who is not equal to the police in knowledge and understanding of the consequences of the
questions and answers being recorded and who is unable to know how to protect his own interests
or how to get the benefits of his constitutional rights." Id. at 54.
79. Id. at 54-55. The Court said that a fourteen-year-old "cannot be compared with an adult in
full possession of his senses and knowledgeable of the consequences of his admissions ....
Without some adult protection against this inequality [between the interrogators and the
defendant], a 14-year-old boy would not be able to know, let alone assert, such constitutional
rights as he had." Id. at 54.
80. Id.: Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948) (plurality opinion).
81. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
82. Id. at 7-8. A neighbor of the defendant made a complaint that she received a phone call
containing lewd and indecent statements. Id. at 4. The Court characterized the remarks as being
of the "irritatingly offensive, adolescent, sex variety." Id. At his delinquency hearing, the
defendant was questioned by the judge. Id. at 6. The complaining witness was not present. Id. at
5. According to the judge, the defendant admitted making the statements during the phone call.
Id. at 6. However, the defendant's parents and the defendant deny that he made an admission. Id.
After being found delinquent, the judge sentenced the defendant to industrial school for "'the
period of his minority (that is, until 21), unless sooner discharged by due process of law."' Id. at
7-8 (quoting the Juvenile Court Hearing).
83. Id. at 10.
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transcript made of the hearing, and he was not given any notice about
84
the charges against him.
Justice Fortas, writing for the majority, went so far as to analogize the
proceedings to the Star Chamber85 and to a kangaroo court. 6 The Court
noted that the absence of procedural safeguards for juveniles had not led
to fair and compassionate treatment, 87 but instead, to arbitrariness,
unfairness, and inadequate or inaccurate findings of fact. 88 The Gault
Court, for the first time, explicitly recognized that the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Bill of Rights protect children as well as adults by
clearly holding that juveniles have due process rights. 89 Accordingly,
the Court held that a juvenile is entitled to proper notice, formal
presentation of charges, appointment of counsel, and the privilege
against self-incrimination. 90 Although Gault was decided a year after
Miranda, the Court did not explain in Gault how, or whether, Miranda
applied to juveniles. In fact, the Court did not set up any specific
safeguards for interrogations of juveniles in Gault, but it did articulate a
91
great concern for the reliability of juvenile confessions.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 18. The Court quoted Dean Pound who wrote that, "'The powers of the Star
Chamber were a trifle in comparison with those of our juvenile courts."' Id. (quoting Young,
Forewordto SOCIAL TREATMENT IN PROBATION AND DELINQUENCY, at xxvii (1937) (quoting
Dean Pound)).
86. Id. at 28. According to Justice Fortas: "Under our Constitution, the condition of being a
boy does not justify a kangaroo court." Id. The Court explained that "the procedural rules which
have been fashioned from the generality of due process ... enhance the possibility that truth will
emerge from the confrontation of opposing versions and conflicting data." Id. at 21.
87. Id. at 18. The Court explained:
The absence of substantive standards has not necessarily meant that children receive
careful, compassionate, individualized treatment. The absence of procedural rules
based upon constitutional principle has not always produced fair, efficient, and
effective procedures. Departures from established principles of due process have
frequently resulted not in enlightened procedure, but in arbitrariness.
Id. at 18-19.
88. Id. at 19-20. The Court found that "[flailure to observe the fundamental requirements of
due process has resulted in instances, which might have been avoided, of unfairness to individuals
and inadequate or inaccurate findings of fact and unfortunate prescriptions of remedy." Id.
89. Id. at 13. The Court noted that some procedural safeguards such as the rights to bail,
indictment by grand jury, public trial, and trial by jury have been held by almost all jurisdictions
to not be required by due process in juvenile proceedings. Id. at 14.
90. Id. at 30-31.
91. Id. at 51-52. The Court noted that "authoritative opinion has cast formidable doubt upon
the reliability and trustworthiness of 'confessions' by children." Id. at 52. The Court also offered
instructions on handling juvenile waivers of Miranda:
We appreciate that special problems may arise with respect to waiver of the privilege
by or on behalf of children, and that there may well be some differences in
technique-but not in principle-depending upon the age of the child and the presence
and competence of parents. The participation of counsel will, of course, assist the
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The Supreme Court finally addressed the application of Miranda
rights to juvenile interrogation in Fare v. Michael C.92 The Court held
that a determination of whether a juvenile knowingly and intelligently
waived his or her rights should be based, just as it is with adults, 93 on
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. 94 Before
confessing to a murder, the sixteen-year-old defendant in Fare
requested an opportunity to speak with his probation officer. 95 The
California Supreme Court accepted the defendant's argument that this
request by a juvenile was an attempt to assert his right to remain silent,
just as a request for a lawyer is considered an invocation of the Fifth
Amendment under Miranda.9 6 The Supreme Court reversed this
extension of Miranda and held that the request by a juvenile for his
probation officer should not operate as a per se invocation of the Fifth
Amendment. 97 Instead, the Court found no reason to apply a different
standard to juvenile confessions from the totality of the circumstances
test applied to adult statements. 98 Although the Court decided to use the
same approach to juvenile interrogations, it asserted that additional
circumstances need to be considered, including the juvenile's age,
experience, education, background, intelligence, his or her capacity to
understand Miranda warnings, the nature of Fifth Amendment rights,
and the consequences of waiving those rights. 99 The Court reasoned

police, Juvenile Courts and appellate tribunals in administering the privilege. If
counsel was not present for some permissible reason when an admission was obtained,
the greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense
not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product of
ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.
Id. at 55.
92. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
93. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
94. Fare,442 U.S. at 724-25.
95. Id. at 710.
96. Id. at 709. The California Supreme Court decided that the defendant's request for his
probation officer was a "per se invocation of [his] Fifth Amendment rights in the same way the
request for an attorney" was under Miranda. Id. at 714-15. The California court reasoned that a
probation officer was a "trusted guardian figure" for a juvenile, and a state law required the
officer to represent the interests of the juvenile. Id. at 714.
97. Id. at 725-26. The Court maintained that a per se rule, such as the one that the California
Supreme Court developed, could undesirably prevent police officers from questioning an older
juvenile who had experience with the justice system. Id.
98. Id. at 725. The Court suggested that a court could find through a consideration of the
totality of the circumstances test that a juvenile's request for a probation officer was an assertion
of the right to remain silent where the juvenile was young and had little experience with the
system. Id.
99. Id.
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that this test provides juvenile courts with flexibility so that the special
concerns regarding children could be considered.l10
However, as pointed out by the dissenters, the Court ignored its
decisions in Haley, Gallegos, and Gault that the interrogations of
juveniles must be examined with more care to ensure that juveniles
make voluntary statements. 1 1 The four dissenting justices argued that
the questioning should have ended when the defendant requested an
opportunity to consult with his probation officer. 10 2 By continuing to
question the defendant, interrogators failed to exercise "the greatest
care" to ensure that he confessed voluntarily. 10 3 Furthermore, the
dissenters pointed out that the Court did not follow Miranda, which
instructs police officers to stop questioning when there is any indication
that the suspect wants to remain silent.'°4
C. Illinois Juvenile Confession Law
Like the majority in Fare v. Michael C., Illinois courts have provided
more protection to juveniles by rejecting opportunities to create per se
rules about the interrogation of juveniles. 10 5 Instead, Illinois courts
apply the totality of the circumstances test, and find that only a
combination of coercive circumstances lead to an involuntary
confession by a juvenile. 10 6 Illinois courts look at the factors listed in
Fare10 7 and also to factors such as police deception, the time of the
interrogation, the presence of an interested adult,'0 8 and the length of
the interrogation. 109 Although the validity of juvenile confessions turns
on a greater number of factors compared to confessions by adults,

100. Id.
101. Id. at 729 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 729-30 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 733-34 (Powell, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 729 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Powell pointed out that the probation officer
told the juvenile to contact him whenever he had any contact with the police. Id. at 733 (Powell,
J., dissenting). The defendant did not believe the officers would bring in an actual lawyer if he
requested one. Id. at 734 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("'How I know you guys won't pull no police
officer in and tell me he's an attorney?"'). The transcripts of the interrogation showed that the
defendant was immature and uneducated. Id. at 733 (Powell, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 728-32 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
105.

See Ronald G. Maimonis, Trials, in ILLINOIS JUVENILE LAW AND PRACTICE 4-1, 4-27

(Ill. Inst. for CLE 2001).
106. See, e.g., In re Lamb, 336 N.E.2d 753 (I11.1975).
107. Fare,442 U.S. at 707.
108. People v. Knox, 542 N.E.2d 910, 913 (I11.App. Ct. 1989). An interested adult is a
parent, guardian, or youth officer who can protect the interest of the juvenile during an
interrogation. Id.
109. People v. Robinson, 704 N.E.2d 968, 972 (111.App. Ct. 1998).
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Illinois courts have indicated that juvenile confessions are to be given
1
the same amount of scrutiny as adult confessions. Io
Under the totality of the circumstances test, confessions are generally
found inadmissible only when they arise as a result of many coercive
circumstances. 1 11 For example, in In re LaShun H.,112 police officers
arrived with guns drawn in the middle of the night to the home of the
113
defendant's uncle, where the fourteen-year-old boy was staying.
They found the juvenile and took him to the police station to question
him about a murder. 114 The questioning began at three-thirty in the
morning, and, after only fifteen minutes of questioning, the police left
the boy alone for more than two hours. 115 The Illinois Appellate Court
relied upon the fact that the defendant was not allowed to speak to his
mother even though she was present at the police station. 116 The court
also relied on the fact that the juvenile had a learning disability and little
prior experience with police. 117 Ultimately, the court held that the
and therefore, deemed
circumstances of the interrogation were coercive,
118
the confession involuntary and inadmissible.
Illinois courts have not found any single factor dispositive in
determining whether a confession is voluntary. 119 Of particular import
is the fact that the Illinois courts do not place extra significance upon
the age of the child being interrogated. 120 In In re G.O., the Illinois
Supreme Court evaluated the defendant's age, thirteen, with the same
focus and emphasis it placed upon the other factors. 12 1 Absent from the
court's analysis was a consideration of how the defendant's young age
could affect the voluntariness of his confession to murder. 122 Despite a
110. In re V.L.T., 686 N.E.2d 49, 54 (111. App. Ct. 1997).
IiI. BARRY FELD, JUVENILE JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION 242 (2000).
112. In re LaShun H., 672 N.E.2d 331 (111.App. Ct. 1996).
113. Id. at 335.
114. Id. at 332.
115. Id. at 335. When the officer returned, he told the defendant that witnesses identified him
as the shooter, but he did not tell the defendant that other witnesses had identified someone else.
Id.
116. Id. The defendant's mother was allowed to talk to him after he confessed, at which point
he immediately told her that he was not the shooter. Id.
117. Id. at 335-36. Although the defendant had two prior encounters with law enforcement,
the court asserted that the unsubstantial encounters had not prepared him to be interrogated as a
murder suspect. Id. at 338.
118. id.at339.
119. Scott, supra note 55, at 137.
120. The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the admission of confessions by thirteen-year-old
defendants. In re G.O., 727 N.E.2d 1003 (I11. 2000); In re W.C., 657 N.E.2d 908 (Ill. 1995).
121. G.O., 727 N.E.2d at 1013.
122. Id.
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lack of analysis on this issue, the court held that the 23
thirteen-year-old
knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights.1
Similarly, claims of physical abuse, being under the influence of
drugs, a low I.Q., and little comprehension of English do not
individually lead Illinois courts to conclude that a confession was
probably coerced. 124 Because claims of physical abuse are generally
denied by police, juveniles who allege that police beat them during an
125
interrogation are often not considered credible by judges or juries.
Furthermore, these allegations by juveniles do not prompt closer
scrutiny of the voluntariness of a confession. 126 For example, the
Illinois Supreme Court held in In re Lamb that a confession was
voluntary even though the juvenile defendant was hung in a cell by
handcuffs and claimed that a police officer struck him.' 2 7 Similarly,
another juvenile was clearly in a drug-induced state in In re Shutters,
but the court found that this condition was only one factor to be
considered. 128 Ultimately, that fact did not affect the court's
determination, and it allowed the confession to stand. 129 In In re
W.C, 13 even though the thirteen-year-old defendant had an I.Q. of
13 1
forty-eight, the court decided that the confession was admissible.
Finally, in In re J.S., despite the fact that four experts testified that the
juvenile defendant could not understand his Miranda rights because he
did not adequately understand English, the court held that the juvenile
132
knowingly and intelligently waived his rights.
Illinois courts will also consider whether the police gave the juvenile
the opportunity to speak with an interested adult, such as a parent or

123. Id.
124. W.C., 657 N.E.2d at 908 (admitting the confession by a defendant with a low I.Q.); In re
Lamb, 336 N.E.2d 753 (I11. 1975) (upholding the admission of a confession where there were
claims of physical abuse); In re J.S., 460 N.E.2d 412 (111. App. Ct. 1984) (upholding the
admission of a statement by a defendant who had little comprehension of English); In re Shutters,
370 N.E.2d 1225 (III. App. Ct. 1977) (allowing admission of a statement by a juvenile under the
influence of drugs).
125. Steve Drizin, When Little Tykes Give 'Full Confessions,' CHI. TRIB., Aug. 26, 1998, § 1,
at 19, available at 1998 WL 2889215. Drizin explains that detectives are "professional
witnesses" and this gives them a "built-in credibility advantage over children," who do not make
good witnesses. Id.
126. Id.
127. Lamb, 336 N.E.2d at 758.
128. Shutters, 370 N.E.2d at 1228.
129. Id.
130. In re W.C., 657 N.E.2d 908 (Il1. 1995).
131. Id. at 922.
132. In re J.S., 460 N.E.2d 412, 418 (111.App. Ct. 1984).
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guardian. 133 In fact, an Illinois statute, the "parental notification
statute" requires the arresting officer to inform a parent or guardian of
where their child is being taken. 134 Although Illinois courts recognize
that one purpose of the law is to provide juveniles an opportunity to
consult with a parent, 135 even a youth officer 136 is considered an
interested adult. 137 Furthermore, courts find confessions voluntary even
if a parent is present at the interrogation location but is not given the
opportunity to consult with the child. 138 Not only can confessions be
admissible when there is no consultation with a parent present at the
location of the interrogation 139 but courts have held that confessions are
admissible when the police do not attempt to notify a parent or guardian
in violation of the parental notification statute." 4° These decisions arise
when courts determine that the lack of notification is the only factor
suggesting a coercive environment, and a lack of other coercive
14 1
circumstances leads to a finding that the confession is voluntary.
Therefore, a failure by the police to notify a juvenile's parents of the
interrogation does not, as with other important factors, make a
juvenile's statement per se inadmissible.
133. People v. Knox, 542 N.E.2d 910, 913 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
134. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-405 (2000). According to the statute, a police officer who
arrests a juvenile must "immediately make a reasonable attempt to notify the parent or other
person legally responsible" for the juvenile's care. Id. This notification must inform the parent
or guardian that the juvenile had been arrested and the location where the juvenile is being held.
Id. The officer who arrests a juvenile without a warrant must then take the juvenile to a youth
officer. Id.
135. In re D.B., 708 N.E.2d 806, 812 (111.App. Ct. 1999).
136. In re G.O., 727 N.E.2d 1003, 1020 (11. 2000) (McMorrow, J., dissenting). A youth
officer is simply a police officer with some additional training. Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
137. But see id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting). Justice McMorrow stated that the presence of a
youth officer does not render a confession voluntary since a youth officer is employed by the
police. Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting). Therefore, the officer is unlikely to adequately represent
the interest of a juvenile. Id.; Steve Drizin, In the Maelstrom: Children as Murder Suspects, CHI.
DALY L. BULL., Aug. 28, 1998, at 5; Jon Sall, 'Confession' by Boys Put Heat on Cops, CHI.
SUN-TIMES, Aug. 16, 1998, at 4. The youth officer sometimes provides no assistance to the
juvenile, as the officer might even just sit silently. Drizin, supra. Drizin argues that this makes
the interrogation even more coercive. Id. He suggests that a youth officer who did advise a
juvenile to consult a lawyer would be "blacklisted" in the police department. Id.
138. People v. Bobe, 592 N.E.2d 301 (I11.App. Ct. 1992). In Bobe, the juvenile's father was
not allowed to ride with his son to the police station. Id. at 311. When he arrived at the station
and requested a chance to talk to his son, the officers did not let him and told him to go home. Id.
The juvenile also claimed that he asked to speak to his father. Id. However, the court decided
that the juvenile's confession was voluntary because there was a youth officer present. Id. at 315.
139. In re J.E. & V.B., 675 N.E.2d 156 (I11.App. Ct. 1996).
140. People v. Zepeda, 265 N.E.2d 647 (I11.1970) (holding that a confession was admissible
when the defendant's parents were not notified because the parental notification statute fails to
provide for sanctions for its violation).
141. People v. Stachelek, 495 N.E.2d 984 (I11.App. Ct. 1986).
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D. Other States' Approaches to Juveniles' Statements

While Illinois employs a totality of the circumstances test to
determine the voluntariness of a confession, several other states
established per se rules about juvenile confessions in order to treat
interrogations of juveniles with more care. 142 These per se rules are
aimed at ensuring that the constitutional rights of juveniles are fully
protected. 143 At least one state, Colorado, mandates the presence of a
parent, guardian, or counsel during an interrogation. 144 Several states
mandate that a parent must be present during the interrogation and that
the juvenile must consult with the parent. 145 Texas requires the
involvement of a member of the judiciary to establish that a confession
is voluntary. 146 Only North Dakota, however, requires, in certain
circumstances, that counsel be present during an interrogation of a
juvenile. 147 Furthermore, New Mexico prohibits the admission of a
statement by any child under the age of thirteen, and it has established a
rebuttable presumption that juveniles who are thirteen and fourteen
148
cannot make a voluntary confession.

142. See infra text accompanying notes 144-48 (describing statutes and cases containing per
se rules concerning juvenile interrogations in Colorado, Indiana, Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Texas, North Dakota. and New Mexico).
143. David T. Huang, "Less Unequal Footing ": State Courts' Per Se Rules for Juvenile
Waivers During Interrogations and the Case for Their Implementation, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 437,
438 (2001).
144. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-511 (2001).
145. In Indiana, a minor can only waive his or her rights after a meaningful consultation with
a lawyer or a parent who has no adverse interest and who knowingly and intelligently waives the
child's rights. IND. CODE. ANN. § 31-32-5-1 (West 1999 & Supp. 2001). Based on A Juvenile,
all minors under the age of fourteen must consult with a parent. Commonwealth v. A Juvenile,
449 N.E.2d 654, 657 (Mass. 1983). Those fourteen and older must consult with a parent unless
found to be highly intelligent. Id. The Supreme Court of Vermont indicated that there must be a
consultation with an interested adult who is not a member of law enforcement, and the adult must
be told about the child's Miranda rights. In re E.T.C., 449 A.2d 937, 940 (Vt. 1982). Connecticut
not only requires a consultation with a parent but the confession must also be made in the
presence of the parent. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-137 (West 1995 & Supp. 2001): In re
Robert M., 576 A.2d 549, 551 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990). In Kansas, minors under fourteen must
consult with a parent or lawyer during an interrogation, otherwise, any statement they make is
inadmissible in court. In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d 1302, 1312 (Kan. 1998).
146. In Texas, a magistrate must instruct a juvenile on his or her rights in the absence of any
member of law enforcement, and the confession must be made in front of a magistrate. TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.095 (West Supp. 2002).
147. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-26 (Michie 1991 & Supp. 2001) (indicating that a parent,
guardian, or counsel must represent a juvenile during an interrogation). The North Dakota
Supreme Court held that the presence of a parent is not enough to constitute representation. In re
J.D.Z., 431 N.W.2d 272, 276 (N.D. 1988). A parent who questions the juvenile along with the
police is not providing representation nor is one who does not take an active role. Id.
148. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-14 (Michie 1999).
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E. Reasonsfor False Confessions by Juveniles
Recent cases throughout the country demonstrate that juveniles
sometimes confess to crimes that they have not committed. 149 For a
number of reasons, juveniles may be more susceptible than adults to
making false confessions. 150 Because their intellectual capacity is not
fully developed yet, children are less likely to understand, appreciate,

149. In California, three intelligent teenage boys falsely confessed to killing one of the boy's
sisters. After hours of interrogation and being told that his parents thought he killed his sister, the
victim's brother confessed. Mark Sauer, True Confessions? Crowe Murder Case Raises
Questions About How Police Arrive at Admissions of Guilt, SAN-DIEGO UNION TRIB., Nov. 29,
1998, at 1. A judge threw out his confession because a videotape of the interrogation showed that
the detectives suggested that he would not go to jail if he confessed. John Wilkens & Mark
Sauer, The Bombshell, SAN-DIEGO UNION TRIB., May 16, 1999, at 1.
In Texas, an eleven-year-old, Lacresha Murray, appears to have admitted to killing a toddler,
but the videotape of the interrogation demonstrated that she was coached by police officers.
Robyn E. Blummer, Children Confess, Whether They Did It or Not, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
May 2, 1999, at 6D, available at 1999 WL 3318219. Murray was sentenced to twenty-five years
imprisonment. Id. However, a judge on appeal found the confession inadmissible because she
was not instructed on her Miranda rights before a magistrate, as required by Texas law. Id.; TEX.
FAM. CODE § 51.095 (West Supp. 2002).
In Ohio, twelve-year-old Anthony Harris confessed to murder under pressure from an
interrogator. 20/20, supra note 12. The evidence showed, however, that he did not have enough
time to commit the crime. Id. Because a tape of the interrogation demonstrated that the
interrogator used coercive techniques, an Ohio Appellate Court eventually threw out his
confession. In re Harris, No. 98JD00644, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 2390, at *32-38 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2000).
Illinois cases include the boys in the Harris case, Olmetti, Hayes, and Huggins, and also an
eleven-year-old known as A.M. Maurice Possley, Boy Convicted of Slaying at Age 10 Appeals,
CHI. TRIB., Jan. 11, 2000, § 2, at I, available at 2000 WL 3625410; see also supra Part I
(discussing the boys in the Harris case). In A.M.'s case, he falsely confessed to murder, even
though he was not physically capable of committing the crime. See Possley, supra. The evidence
indicated that the 173-pound victim was dragged through her house, but A.M. only weighed
eighty-eight pounds at the time. Id. A.M. was interrogated by James Cassidy who also
questioned the young boys in the Ryan Harris case. Id. A.M. claims that Cassidy told him that if
he confessed, he could go home and would be able to attend his brother's birthday party. Charles
Nicodemus, Confessions Uncoerced, Cop Says, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 13, 2000. at 16, available
at 2000 WL 6664305. According to A.M., Cassidy also told him that "they [the police officers]
would forgive him 'like God would forgive him"' if he confessed. Bach, supra note 16, at 22-23.
When his mother was allowed into the interrogation room, A.M. told her that he had lied to the
police officers. Id. He told her that he was scared, and he wanted the interrogation to end. Id. In
addition to the size issue, evidence, including the size of fingerprints and a footprint at the crime
scene, indicated that an adult committed the crime. Id. A.M.'s confession did not conform to the
facts of the case; he said that he used a rope to strangle the victim, but a telephone cord was used.
Id. A.M., now sixteen, is appealing his conviction in federal court. Maurice Possley, Judge
Questions Cop's Conduct in Boy's Confession; 1993 Murder Case Ordered Reopened, CHI. TRIB.
Oct. 19, 1999, § 1, at 1, available at 1999 WL 2923276.
150. See infra Part II.E.I-2 (identifying reasons for juveniles' susceptibility to making false
confessions).
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and exercise their Miranda rights. 151 In addition, juveniles are more
likely to want to please and believe police officers because the officers
are authority figures. 152 Finally, because minors are incapable of fully
realizing the consequences of their decisions, 153 they may confess
because they believe it is the only way to end a psychologically
54
coercive interrogation.1
1. Empirical Studies: Misunderstanding of Miranda by Juveniles
Studies indicate that juveniles do not have the same capacity as adults
to understand and appreciate their constitutional rights recognized in
Miranda.5 5 Professor Thomas Grisso conducted several studies testing
juveniles recently in police custody. 156 Grisso concluded that juveniles
under the age of sixteen, especially those with low I.Q. scores, are not
able to fully understand their constitutional rights. 157 Overall, Grisso
found that four-fifths of the juveniles studied did not adequately
understand at least one of the four Miranda warnings. 158 In particular,
they showed the greatest misunderstanding of how the right to remain
silent and the right to an attorney applied to them before and during
interrogation. 159 In fact, only thirty percent understood the latter

151. See infra Part II.E.I (describing studies that have found that juveniles do not understand
and appreciate their Miranda warnings); supra Part II.A (discussing the Supreme Court's
decision in Miranda).
152. See infra Part II.E.2.b (explaining the power differential between juveniles and police
officers).
153. The inability of minors to understand legal concepts and to make decisions is reflected in
several laws. As pointed out in a dissenting opinion in In re G.O., Illinois legislators have
decided that juveniles do not have the capacity to own a credit card, get a tattoo, consume
alcohol, or drive. In re G.O., 727 N.E.2d 1003, 1017 (Ill. 2000) (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
154. See infra Part II.E.2.a (describing the tactics used on juveniles to convince them to
confess).
155.

THOMAS GRISSO, JUVENILES'

WAIVER OF RIGHTS: LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL

COMPETENCE 128 (1981). Grisso is a professor of psychiatry and he is considered an expert on
juvenile interrogations. Eig, supra note 14, at 83.
156. GRISSO, supra note 155, at 66. Grisso decided to base his study on juveniles who had
recently been in police custody because they best represented the population who would be
subject to interrogations. Id. It should be noted that the research was conducted under conditions
that could differ from the conditions present at an actual interrogation. Id. at 68. Most
significantly, a juvenile is likely to feel more stress during an interrogation. Id. Thus, the results
may not accurately reflect a juvenile's ability to comprehend his or her rights while a suspect. Id.
157. Id. at 128. Juveniles with an I.Q. less than 90 were found to be less able to understand
their rights. Id. This finding is significant because Grisso also found that most of the juveniles
who are referred to courts have an I.Q. that is less than 90. Id.
158. Id. at 73.
159. Id.
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right.160 Nearly two-thirds did not understand the meaning or definition
of words recited in the Miranda warnings, let alone what
"interrogation" meant. 16 1 Furthermore, the majority of juveniles
thought that a judge could force them to speak or that a police officer
162
could persuade them to speak.
In another study, Professor Grisso collected data on actual
interrogations. 163 In that study, he discovered that only ten percent of
juveniles asserted their right to remain silent.' 64 Ultimately, these
empirical studies indicate that few juveniles adequately understand their
constitutional rights, which may minimize the protection these rights are
165
designed to provide.

160. Id. at 74. Grisso found that many of the juveniles did not understand that they could
have an attorney during the interrogation as well as one in court. Id.
161. Id. at 75. "Interrogation" was the most misunderstood word. Id. In fact, the juveniles
surveyed believed that an interrogation meant a court hearing, or they simply had no frame of
reference for understanding what an interrogation meant. Id.
162. Id. at 129. Other researchers have found similar results. A. Bruce Ferguson & Alan
Charles Douglas, A Study of Juvenile Waiver, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 39, 53 (1970). Professors
Ferguson and Douglas questioned juveniles who waived their rights, and found that only five out
of eighty-six truly understood their rights. Id. Ferguson and Douglas are law school professors
who were prompted to conduct their study by a California Supreme Court decision, In re Dennis
M. In re Dennis M., 450 P.2d 296 (Cal. 1969). In this decision, the court instructed juvenile
police officers to provide Mirandawarnings to juveniles in terms that they could understand. Id.
at 308 n.13. In response, Ferguson and Douglas tested the ability of juveniles to understand
simplified Miranda rights. Ferguson & Douglas, supra, at 40-44. They discovered that
simplifying the rights had no effect on their ability to understand them. Id. at 54. The rights were
simplified to read:
You don't have to talk to me at all, now or later on, it is up to you. If you decide to
talk to me, I can go to court and repeat what you say, against you. If you want a
lawyer, an attorney, to help you to decide what to do, you can have one free before and
during questioning by me now or by anyone else later on. Do you want me to explain
or repeat anything about what I have just told you? Remembering what I've just told
you, do you want to talk to me?
Id. at 40.
163. GRISSO, supra note 155, at 25.
164. Id. at 38. For those under fifteen, the rate of refusal to talk was "virtually nonexistent."
Id. at 37. According to another study, forty-two percent of adults asserted their right to remain
silent. Id. at 38.
165. FELD, supra note I11,at 219.
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2. Circumstances of Juvenile Interrogations
a. Police Tactics

The interrogation techniques used by police officers on juveniles also
contribute to false confessions. 166 The technique used by many police
officers, 167 known as the Reid Technique, 168 places psychological
pressure on suspects to convince them to confess.' 69 This pressure is
sometimes achieved through police deception. 170 Used on adults 171
as
well, creators adapted the Reid Technique for use on juveniles.
Although Illinois courts indicate that police deception is a consideration
in the totality of the circumstances test, 17 2 false confession cases73suggest
that these techniques are used during interrogations of juveniles.1
The Reid Technique requires that the interrogator make the suspect
feel powerless in his surroundings.' 7 4 This powerlessness can be
accomplished by forcing the suspect to have an escort in order to leave
the room at the police station.1 75 The Miranda warnings are often read
while the officers are still friendly with the suspect and have yet to
become confrontational, so that the suspect feels more comfortable in
waiving these rights. 176 Finally, officers are trained to provide suspects
with two alternatives: the first alternative leads to a significant
punishment, while the second alternative leads to a lesser punishment or

166. FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 216 (3d ed.
1986). These methods were examined by the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966).
167. Eig, supra note 14, at 84. The technique is used by officers in Cook County. Id.
168. Videotape: Protecting Children, Preserving the Truth (Northwestern University Law
School 2000) (on file with the Loyola University Chicago Child Law Center) [hereinafter
Protecting Children].
169. Eig, supra note 14, at 84.
170. Id.
171. INBAU ET AL., supra note 166, at 137. In fact, officers are provided with methods
specifically designed to convince a juvenile suspect to confess, but these methods are based on
and to be used in addition to the general technique. Id. at 137-41. For example, when shifting
blame, interrogators are instructed to blame the juvenile's parents and neighborhood. Id. at 13739. Interrogators are also given arguments to be used to convince parents to allow the
questioning of their children. Id. at 139.
172. People v. Robinson, 704 N.E.2d 968 (11. App. Ct. 1998) (indicating that police deception
is a relevant factor to consider in the totality of the circumstances test).
173. Eig, supra note 14, at 83. Interrogation and coercion expert Richard Ofshe found that
police use the same techniques on children as they use on adults. Id. Some interrogators from
Chicago who were interviewed admitted that the tactics are the same. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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no punishment at all. 7 7 For example, suspects might be told that a
murder could either have been intentional or in the heat of passion, the
latter carrying a lighter sentence. The suspect must then choose
between two confessions and may be tempted to claim that he or she
committed the lesser offense so that an unavoidable punishment will not
178
be as harsh.
One of the main tools of deception employed by police through the
Reid Technique involves an officer lying about the amount and quality
of evidence already obtained. 179 Officers may suggest that there is
extensive incriminating evidence, which leads suspects to believe that
they will be convicted even if they do not confess during the
interrogation. 181 Officers will also point to "tests" that suspects failed,
such as a voice analyzer test, even where the officers know that the tests
are invalid. 18 1 Such lies by the police are designed to erode the
confidence of suspects. 182 The Reid Technique also instructs officers to
offer excuses to suspects to make the suspect feel more comfortable
1 83
with saying that he or she committed the crime.
In many false confession cases involving juveniles, the juvenile
repeatedly said during the interrogation that he or she did not commit
the crime in question. 184 The questioning police officer typically
ignores these denials, which frustrates the juvenile. 185 Police officers
use some techniques with juveniles based on their immaturity. 186 For
177. 20/20, supra note 12.
178. Id. Anthony Harris, age 12, was questioned about the death of his neighbor. Id. The
interrogator suggested that if he admitted that he killed the neighbor, Anthony might just receive
counseling as his punishment. Id. Anthony confessed because he thought that it would allow him
to go home. Id.
179. Ofshe & Leo, supra note 15, at 985-86.
180. Protecting Children, supra note 168; see also Ofshe & Leo, supra note 15, at 985-86.
Sometimes interrogators convince the suspect that he or she has no memory of committing the
crime in question. Ofshe & Leo, supra note 15, at 986.
181. See, e.g., Sauer, supra note 149. In the Crowe case, the victim's brother was told that a
Voice Stress Test detected deception in his voice. Id.
182. Protecting Children, supra note 168.
183. Id.
184. Anthony Harris repeatedly told his interrogator that he did not kill his neighbor, but the
detective ignored him. 20/20, supra note 12. Lacresha Murray told police officers almost forty
times that she did not kill the victim. Blummer, supra note 149. Michael Crowe denied killing
his sister more than eighty times. Tony Perry, Doubts Are Raised on Police Tactics, and Whether
Three Bright Teenagers or an Unstable Transient Killed Girl, L.A. TIMES, May 11, 1999, at A1,
available at 1999 WL 2157150.
185. 20/20, supra note 12.
186. In the Ryan Harris case, the police interrogators began the interrogation by asking the
boys about their hobbies and schools. Brown, supra note 18, at Fl. One of the interrogators told
the boys that he was their "friend," and he asked the boys to hold hands with the officers. Id.
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example, an effective tactic for juvenile interrogations is a promise that
the child will be able to see his or her parent only after a confession is
made.' 87 Finally, officers may withhold food or the use of a bathroom,
which can be traumatic for a child. 188 Because juveniles can fail to
appreciate the consequences of falsely confessing, these psychologically
189
coercive tactics inevitably lead to false confessions by juveniles.
b. Inherent Power Differential between Juveniles and Police Officers
Experts in interrogations have determined that some people are more
likely than others to make a false confession. 19° Some of the people
most susceptible to making a false confession are those in awe of police
191
officers, because they believe that a police officer would not lie.
While not all juveniles are in awe of police officers, the differences in
age, experience, and knowledge between police officers and most
juveniles creates an intimidating environment. 192 Research shows that
children want to please authority figures, and, therefore, children
sometimes try to answer questions in a way that they believe will please
the police officer. 193 Furthermore, studies indicate that children are
suggestible, and through leading and repeated questions they may make
inaccurate statements. 194 The combination of these characteristics
contribute to juveniles' susceptibility to falsely confessing.
III. DISCUSSION
The Illinois legislature considered several proposals before it created
a new procedural safeguard through section 405/5-170 to protect

After the boys made some incriminating statements, the officers brought McDonald's Happy
Meals to the boys. Id.
187. 20/20, supra note 12.
188. Eig, supra note 14, at 133.
189. ld.; Bach, supra note 16, at 21. An expert on child witnesses, Richard Leo said: "[A]
false confession is the natural consequence of police toughness on young adults." Bach, supra
note 16, at 21.
190. Sandi Dolbee, The Lying Game: Coaxing Confession with Lies May Be Legal-But Is It
Ethical?, SAN-DIEGO UNION TRIB., May 21, 1999, § E, at 1.
191. Id.
192. See, e.g., Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948)
(plurality opinion).
193. Eig, supra note 14, at 53. One study found that the "good cop, bad cop" tactic made
about half of children who were five to seven years old make false statements. Id. The children
were convinced to lie because they were rewarded for desired answers and met disappointment in
response to unwanted answers. Id.
194. Barbara Kaban & Ann E. Tobey, When Police Question Children: Are Protections
Adequate?, 1 J. CENTER CHILD. & CTS. 151, 151 (1999).
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juveniles during interrogations. 195 These proposals differed both in
terms of the form of the safeguard and the categories of juveniles
covered. 196 Legislators designed these proposals to prevent false
confessions by juveniles, but pressure from law enforcement groups led
197
to important limitations in the enacted legislation.
A. Legislative History
The first proposal to the Illinois legislature concerning juvenile
interrogations differed significantly from the law enacted in that it did
not require the presence of a lawyer during the interrogation. Speaker
Michael Madigan introduced House Bill 3674.198 Instead of requiring
representation during the entire interrogation, only a consultation with a
lawyer was mandated by House Bill 3674.199 However, House Bill
3674 called for the presence of a parent during the interrogation. 2 °° The
bill indicated that its requirements applied to anyone under the age of
fifteen. 20 1 In addition, any confession obtained in violation of the
20 2
provisions of House Bill 3674 would be inadmissible in court.
Although House Bill 3674 never made it out of the House Judiciary
Committee, this committee amended a Senate bill, Senate Bill 730, to
address the needs of juveniles during interrogations. 20 3 First, the
amendment, House Amendment 1, deleted the language of Senate Bill
730 in its entirety. 2°4 Then, House Amendment 1 required legal
195. See infra Part III.A (discussing H.B. 3674 that would have required a consultation with a
lawyer and the presence of a parent and S.B. 730 that mandated legal representation during the
entire interrogation).
196. See infra Part I.A.
197. See infra Part 1II.B (explaining that law enforcement groups opposed the bills because
they believed the safeguards would hamper interrogations of juveniles).
198. H.B. 3674, 91st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2000).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. At the same time, the House dealt with another bill, H.B. 4697, that would have
required counsel during interrogations of minors. H.B. 4697, 91st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (I11.
2000). This bill was also proposed by Speaker Madigan, and it not only required the presence of
counsel, but also required law enforcement to videotape the entire interrogation. Id. The
opposition to the videotaping requirement by police officers and prosecutors resulted in its defeat.
Dave McKinney, Videotape Bill Fails in House; Police Won't Have to Film Confessions, CHI.
SUN-TIMES, Mar. 26, 1999, at 18, available at 1999 WL 6531564. Law enforcement contended
that it would be "unwieldy" and expensive. Joel Coen, Police, Prosecutors Fight Videotaped
Interrogations,CHI. TRIB., Mar. 1, 2000, § 1, at 1, available at 2000 WL 3641133. They also
argued that the bill suggested that police officers were not credible and it attacked their
professionalism. Id.
203. S.B. 730, 91st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (I11. 2000), amended by House Amendment 1.
204. Id.
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representation during the entire interrogation, as opposed to only a
consultation. 205 It applied to minors under the age of seventeen but did
not indicate whether statements obtained in violation of the law would
be inadmissible. 20 6 Finally, Senate Bill 730, as amended by House
Amendment 1, limited the requirement of counsel to interrogations of
murder or sexual assault suspects. 20 7 When House Amendment 1 went
to the House of Representatives, the members voted to table the
20 8
amendment.
Because the amendment to Senate Bill 730 was tabled, the House
Judiciary Committee drafted another amendment, House Amendment
2.209 House Amendment 2 represented a compromise crafted by
Speaker Madigan's staff,2 10 and it limited the number of juveniles who
would receive the proposed protection.2 11 Instead of applying to
interrogations of minors under the age of seventeen, this version
212
required counsel only for minors under the age of thirteen.
Furthermore, Senate Bill 730, as amended by House Amendment 2,
narrowed this class of juveniles further by limiting the safeguard to
suspects of murder or sexual assault.2 13 This version passed both
houses, 2 14 and Illinois Governor George Ryan signed Senate Bill 730
into law on July 7, 2000.215 Section 405/5-170, therefore, prohibits the
interrogation of a child under the age of thirteen suspected of
committing a murder or sexual assault without the presence of
counsel. 2 16 Section 405/5-170, however, does not indicate whether a

205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. House Roll Call, S.B. 730, 113th Legis. Day (Ill. 2000). The amendment was defeated
with seventy-eight nays and forty yeas. Id.
209. S.B. 730, 91st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2000), amended by House Amendment 2.
210. Christi Parsons & Ryan Keith, Bill Offers Legal Aid to Kids in Homicides; Legislation
Reaction to Ryan Harris Case, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 14, 2000, § 1, at 1, available at 2000 WL
3655877.
211. S.B. 730, 91st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (I11.2000), amended by House Amendment 2.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. House Roll Call, S.B. 730, 118th Legis. Day (I11.2000) (passing with 111 yeas and six
nays); Senate Roll Call, S.B. 730, 101st Legis. Day (Ill. 2000) (passing unanimously).
215. Act of July, 7, 2000, Pub. Act No. 91-915, § 405/5-160, 2000 Legis. Serv. 2649 (West).
The bill became law at 705 ILCS 405/5-160. However, an amendment changed the section
number to 405/5-170. General Revisory Act, Public Act 92-16, § 87, 2001 Legis. Serv. 1329,
1643 (West).
216. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-160 (2001), amended by P.A. 92-16 § 87 (codified as
amended at 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-170).
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confession obtained in violation
of the law would be inadmissible in
2 17
court against the juvenile.
B. Proponentsvs. Opponents: Goals & Criticisms
The Illinois legislature relied upon numerous reasons for passing
section 405/5-170, and, with various arguments, opponents to the
legislation convinced the legislators to limit the application of the new
law. Illinois House Speaker Michael Madigan proposed his version in
response to the Ryan Harris case and other false confession cases in
Chicago. 2 18 Recognizing that children are susceptible to coercion,
legislators first wanted to find a way to prevent false confessions by
juveniles. 2 19 Second, legislators thought that the law would benefit
217. Id.
218. Madigan said that he was "outraged" by the Harris case and other cases. Parsons &
Keith, supra note 210. His spokesman later said that "[t]here are numerous examples of
questionable police and prosecutorial actions" and that the law would "remove all doubt" about
the validity of confessions. Daniel C. Vock, New Law on Kid Confessions Flawed: Critics, CHI.
DAILY L. BULL., Aug. 31, 2000, at 1.
219. Illinois Senator Carl Hawkinson said that representation of young children, "decrease[s]
the likelihood that they will be questioned in such a way that would elicit false confessions."
Parsons & Keith, supra note 210. Representative Scott argued against tabling House Amendment
1, which applied the proposed procedural safeguard broadly by including all juveniles under the
age of seventeen. Scott stated that he objected for several reasons including:
[T]he high susceptibility of false confessions of juveniles. There's a tremendous body
of evidence on this particular subject. Many studies that talk about how the vast, vast
majority of juveniles do not understand the rights that [sic] given to them under the
Miranda warnings, thus, making the false confessions more susceptible. We saw a tape
when we did a committee hearing on this in Chicago that showed a confession from a
case in San Diego, where a young man had confessed to murdering his sister. The only
problem was, he hadn't done it. He confessed to it after a long period of time in a
confession, where he was being interrogated, and he confessed after being told finally
that he could go home if he did that. And that's a frequent thing that we see in many of
these false confession cases involving juveniles. We all know of very high-profile
cases here in Illinois, and I'm not going to recite the litany of those that are absolutely
false confessions that are made by juveniles.
S.B. 730, 113th Legis. Day (Il. 2000).
Another sponsor of the bill in the House, Representative Monique-Scott Davis, also opposed
tabling the Amendment. She argued:
[B]ased upon recent occurrences, we are well aware of the need of young people to
have legal representation ... I was speaking to one of my colleagues this morning, and
I said to them, 'This is the 91st General Assembly, it is not the Third Reich.' I believe
young people who find themselves in jeopardy of spending many years in incarceration
are entitled to legal representation to make sure that all of their rights are adhered to
and also that children do not falsely confess to crimes because they are fearful of what
that adult holds for them because of threats that may be made to that young person....
We should vote 'no' on this Motion, if we care about the children in the State of
Illinois, if we care about their rights being adhered to. You don't know what may
happen in your own district, where a child is falsely accused ....
And because of
threats, because of fear, because of only the police officer being in on the interrogation
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police officers because it could protect them from false accusations of
coercion. 220 Third, the sponsors of the bill recognized that, as the State
transfers more juveniles into the adult criminal justice system, the1
22
conviction of a juvenile could result in even greater punishment.
Fourth, Illinois legislators noted that other states enacted similar
provisions to protect children during interrogations. 222 Fifth, they
recognized that because children are incapable of entering into a legal
contract, it follows that they would be incapable of knowingly and
intelligently waiving their Miranda rights. 223 Finally, one of the
sponsors argued that the law could prevent county governments from
having to pay monetary damages to remedy juveniles who were coerced
224
into making false confessions.
Despite these objectives, the proposed legislation's requirement of
counsel quickly met with opposition from Illinois police agencies and

this child falsely admits something he didn't do. He needs to have legal representation.
There's absolutely no reason we should not provide it.
S.B. 730, 113th Legis. Day (Ill. 2000).
220. Vock, supra note 218.
221. S.B. 730, 113th Legis. Day (Il1. 2000) (comments of Rep. Scott). Representative Scott
said:
[R]ecognize what we've done in the last couple years. We've made many, many
juvenile court cases that used to be under the Juvenile Act now transferable to adult
court.... [A] juvenile who confesses to these crimes may end up going to prison for
the rest of his or her life.
Id. While the maximum amount of time that a juvenile can be incarcerated is eight years, 705
ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-750(2) (2000), a juvenile who is transferred to the adult system can
receive life imprisonment, 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-8-1(a)(l)(c)(ii) (2000).
222. S.B. 730, 113th Legis. Day (Ill. 2000). Representative Scott pointed to several states that
require a parent to be present, like Colorado which decided that a juvenile cannot be convicted
based on a confession alone. /d; see also supra Part II.D.
223. S.B. 730, 113th Legis. Day (Il1. 2000) (comments of Rep. Scott). Representative Scott
stated:
We let juveniles who are under 18 years old get out of a contract. If they've purchased
a toaster they can go back and undo it the next day because the contracts are
presumptively void as a matter of law. Now, we won't let a juvenile buy a toaster on
his own, unless he has some other backup from his parents, but we'll let him confess to
a crime that'll put him in prison for the rest of his life without having a full
understanding of the Miranda rights.
Id.
224. Id. Representative Scott noted that the Cook County Board filed a resolution asking the
Illinois legislature to require counsel for all juveniles suspected of committing a Class I felony.
Id. Scott explained that the Board requested this "because they've had to pay money for damages
and for monetary awards for false confessions of juvenile cases. And so they're saying from a
liability standpoint, that this is necessary to do." Id. The families of the boys involved in the
Harris case sued the city for $100 million. Family Sues for $100m, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Feb.
18, 1999, at 4A, available at 1999 WL 3953772.
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prosecutors.22 5 Police officers argued that the requirement of counsel
would hamper interrogations, 226 because most minors would not be able
to afford counsel preventing an interrogation at all, 227 and, even if they
could, most lawyers do not usually allow their clients to be
interrogated.22 8 In addition, state's attorneys asserted that the
requirement of counsel infringes on the role of parents. 229 This
opposition is responsible, in part, for the changes to S.B. 730 that
limited the requirement of counsel to minors under the age of thirteen
and eliminated the exclusionary clause for confessions obtained from a
minor without representation. 230 Nevertheless, members of law
enforcement and prosecutorial agencies
still did not support the version
23 1
ultimately passed and signed into law.
Beyond law enforcement and prosecutorial objections, the Governor
23 2
and other state legislators recognized that the law had shortcomings.
In fact, Michael Madigan, the original sponsor of House Bill 3674 (the
first proposal concerning juvenile interrogations), admitted that the law
is less than what he wanted.23 3 House Majority Leader Barbara Flynn
Currie believed that the law made some progress in addressing the
problems with juvenile confessions, but she, too, thought that juveniles
234
who are thirteen years and older should be covered by the statute.
Though he signed the bill into law, Governor George Ryan revealed his

225. Parsons & Keith, supra note 210.
226. Id.
227. Aaron Chambers, Bill to Protect Juveniles in Police Custody is Introduced, CHI. DAILY
L. BULL., Jan. 26, 2000, at 1.
228. Vock, supra note 218. Chicago Police Department Chief of Staff Thomas P. Needham
stated that "[n]o defense attorney I know will allow his clients to be interviewed." Id. Chief
Needham also argued that the statute would hamper investigations because investigators do not
always know who is a suspect and who is a witness. Id. Therefore, investigators may need to
question many thirteen-year-olds, for example, before they determine who is a suspect. Id.
229. Matthew P. Jones, a lobbyist for the Illinois State's Attorneys Association, said
"[parents] don't need to get a doctor in order to make medical decisions for a child, so why do
[they] need an attorney for a legal decision?" Id.
230. S.B. 730, 118th Legis. Day (Ill. 2000) (comments of Representative Scott).
Representative Scott explained during the debate that by not including an exclusionary provision,
it would be up to a judge to decide whether a confession obtained in violation of the statute could
be admissible. Id.
231. Don't Dilute Protectionfor Kids, Editorial, CHI. TRIB., May 2, 2000, § 1, at 12, available
at 2000 WL 3661486. Police organizations unsuccessfully tried to convince the Governor to
issue an amendatory veto. Id. The amendment would have allowed interrogations where a
parent was present. Id.
232. Christi Parsons, Ryan Oks Safeguardfor Young Suspects, CHI. TRIB., July 8, 2000, § 1, at
1, available at LEXIS, News, Chicago Tribune.
233. Parsons & Keith, supra note 210.
234. Parsons, supra note 232.
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concerns about the law in a letter to lawmakers. 235 He focused
primarily on the absence of a mechanism for actually providing counsel
to minors covered by the law. 236 Ryan advocated that the law should
contain an exception so that a juvenile's statements could be used when
237
authorities seek to place the child into counseling or social services.
Finally, Ryan argued that there should be a penalty for violations of the
238
law.
IV.

ANALYSIS

Although section 405/5-170 will be useful in preventing some false
confessions and uninformed waivers of Miranda rights by juveniles, the
law is an inadequate attempt to prevent false confessions. 239 This law,
however, is clearly necessary for four reasons. 240 First, minors,
especially those under the age of thirteen, do not have the capacity to
knowingly and intelligently waive their Miranda rights. 24 1 Second, the
law is necessary because the power differential between police officers
and young children is inherently coercive, and this differential can
easily lead to false confessions. 242 Third, Illinois courts give little
consideration to the age of the juvenile suspect under the totality of the
circumstances test when determining whether a confession is voluntary,
and, thus, minors do not receive sufficient protection through the
application of this test. 243 Finally, requiring the presence of a lawyer,
because a lawyer is better able to
instead of a parent, is more desirable
244
protect the child's legal rights.
Despite its benefits and protections, the new law is inadequate for
three reasons. 245 First, section 405/5-170 does not apply to most
235. Vock, supra note 218.
236. Id.
237. Parsons, supra note 232.
238. Id.
239. See infra Part IV.A-B (analyzing the positive aspects and the flaws of section 405/5170).
240. See infra text accompanying notes 241-44 (identifying why section 405/5-170 is
necessary).
241. See infra text accompanying notes 249-54 (discussing young children's lack of
understanding of Miranda).
242. See infra text accompanying notes 255-57 (describing the power differential between
police officers and young children).
243. See infra text accompanying notes 258-67 (analyzing Illinois courts' lack of protection of
juveniles through the application of the totality of the circumstances test).
244. See infra text accompanying notes 268-77 (arguing that parents to do not provide
significant protection to minors).
245. See infra text accompanying notes 246-48 (stating the inadequacies of the section 405/5170).
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juveniles, and, thus, the constitutional rights of many juveniles will not
be adequately protected.2 46 Second, there are no ramifications for
violating the law, because it contains no inadmissibility provision,
which may make violations more likely than compliance.2 47 Finally,
section 405/5-170 does not set forth how counsel will actually be
provided when required.248
A. The Necessity of Section 405/5-170
In requiring a lawyer to represent certain minors during an
interrogation, the Illinois legislature demonstrated that it is serious
about preventing false confessions by at least some juveniles. 249 It is
clear that a change was needed to protect juveniles and that requiring
the presence of counsel is an effective safeguard. 250 First, the Miranda
requirements do not serve their purpose unless a suspect understands
them. 25 1 Because most children do not have the capacity to understand
or appreciate these rights, they should not be given an opportunity to
waive them. 252 Without greater protections for young children, the
Miranda decision effectively has no meaning for them. 25 3 Furthermore,
minors twelve and under have the most difficulty understanding and
appreciating their Miranda rights, 254 and as a group, young children are
likely to have less experience in the criminal justice system than older
juveniles.

246. See infra text accompanying notes 278-90 (criticizing section 405/5-170's age and crime
limitations)
247. See infra text accompanying notes 291-96 (arguing that the lack of an inadmissibility
provision affects the likelihood of police officers' compliance with the law)
248. See infra text accompanying notes 297-302 (asserting that the law's failure to provide
counsel harms the public and juveniles)
249. Many of the professional groups concerned with criminal justice and juvenile justice
advocate the requirement of consultation with counsel. FELD, supra note 111, at 242. These
groups include The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice,
the National Advisory Committee Task Force on Juvenile Justice, and the American Bar
Association. Id.
250. See infra text accompanying notes 251-77 (providing reasons why the law is necessary).
251. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). These include the right to remain silent
and the right to an attorney. Id. at 444-45.
252. See supra Part II.E (discussing juvenile's difficulties with understanding the Miranda
rights).
253. According to one judge: "Plainly, one who is told something he does not understand is no
better off than one who is told nothing at all." United States v. Frazier, 476 F.2d 891, 900 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
254. GRISSO, supra note 155, at 81-82.
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Second, minors under the age of thirteen are the most susceptible to
subtle forms of coercion by police officers. 25 5 Because of the clear
power differential between police officers and young children, any
deception or false promises made by police officers could lead to a false
confession. 256 In fact, experts agree that children twelve and under are
257
at the greatest risk of succumbing to suggestions and coercion.
Therefore, these children are most in need of protection during
interrogations.
Third, in passing section 405/5-170, the Illinois legislature correctly
recognized that the totality of the circumstances test employed by
258
Illinois courts does not sufficiently protect a child's Miranda rights.
In fact, most courts applying the totality of the circumstances test find
that a juvenile's confession is voluntary under almost all
circumstances. 259 These findings of voluntariness practically result in a
presumption of admissibility when a juvenile confesses. 260 The United
States Supreme Court asserted that the totality test was appropriate for
juveniles because it offered flexibility, 26 1 however, it appears that the
application of the test is anything but flexible. 262 Courts virtually ignore
the age of the child, the child's inability to understand or appreciate his
263
Mirandarights, and a child's susceptibility to coercion.
Proponents of the totality of the circumstances test argue that it is an
appropriate standard because it complements the parens patriae theory
of juvenile justice. 264 Under this theory, confessions should be admitted
because of the child's interest in rehabilitation. 265 Per se rules, such as

255. Eig, supra, note 14, at 83. According to interrogation expert Richard Ofshe, "[a] sevenyear-old would be child's play. If you're willing to threaten him, even mildly, he'll say anything
you want." Id.
256. See supra Part II.E.
257. Kaban & Tobey, supra note 194, at 156.
258. See supra Part II.C (explaining the application of the totality of the circumstances test in
Illinois courts). Feld found that "when judges actually apply the 'totality' test, they exclude only
the most egregiously obtained confessions and then only on a haphazard basis." FELD, supra note
111, at 215.
259. Robert E. McGuire, A Proposal to Strengthen Juvenile Miranda Rights: Requiring
ParentalPresencein Custodial Interrogations,53 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1376 (2000).
260. Id. at 1377.
261. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979).
262. McGuire, supra note 259, at 1377.
263. FELD, supra note 11l, at 215-16; see, e.g., In re G.O., 727 N.E.2d 1003 (I11.2000).
264. Trey Meyer, Comment, Testing the Validity of Confessions and Waivers of the SelfIncriminationPrivilegein the Juvenile Courts, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 1036, 1067 (1999).
265. Id. Meyer notes that juvenile courts were created to intervene and act as parents to
children whose parents had failed to provide guidance. Id. at 1040. The court could help
delinquent children by providing them with rehabilitative services. Id.
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section 405/5-170, can prevent children from receiving rehabilitative
services. 266 However, this argument ignores the fact that rehabilitation
is completely abandoned for some juveniles when they are transferred
to the adult criminal system. 267 For other juveniles, while they may
receive some services in the juvenile system, the overall harm of being
falsely convicted outweighs the benefits of these services.
Finally, Illinois is the first state to specifically require the presence of
a lawyer, even when the parent or guardian is available. 26 8 In doing so,
the Illinois legislature recognized that lawyers are better able to protect
269
children, and thus prevent false confessions, than most parents.
Parents may be ill equipped to adequately protect the child for two
reasons. First, parents may have a conflict of interest with their
children. 270 Second, parents may not fully understand the Miranda
rights and thus might pressure the child to confess as well.27 ' In fact,
studies indicate that parents do not adequately protect children during
interrogations. 272 According to a survey of parents, only twenty percent
believed that juveniles should be able to withhold information from
police officers. 273 Another study, focusing on the communication
between parents and children during interrogations, found that most
parents gave no direct advice about waiving the Miranda rights, and
those that did advised waiver. 274 These results are explained by the fact
that the parents surveyed thought it was important for children to
cooperate with police. 275 Parents also believed that their children
needed to face the consequences of their actions. 276 Finally, parents

266. Id. at 1067. Meyer argues that suppressing a confession based on a "technical procedural
violation" will prevent some children from receiving the rehabilitative care they need. Id.
267. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-130 (1999 & Supp. 2001).
268. See supra Part II.D (noting approaches other states have adopted concerning
interrogations of juveniles). While North Dakota requires a lawyer or a parent, a parent who
actually represents his or her child is considered sufficient.
269. Steve A. Drizin, Quelling an Outcry with Meaningless Refonns, CHI. DAILY L. BULL.,
Oct. 8, 1998, at 6. Drizin argues that lawyers are really needed to protect juveniles instead of
parents. Drizin, supra note 137. Drizin indicates that parents sometimes just believe that their
children are being questioned as witnesses, and so they allow their children to talk. Id. When the
child becomes a suspect, the police do not always notify the parents. Id.
270. FELD, supra note 111, at 234. Conflicts can arise, for example, when a parent is also a
suspect. Little v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 957 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari)
271. FELD, supra note 11, at 234.
272. GRISSO, supra note 155, at 179.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 187.
275. Id. at 180.
276. Id. at 181.
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would receive more lenient
believed that if their child cooperated they 277
treatment from police, prosecutors, or judges.
B. Section 405/5-170 Still Falls Short
While it responds to many valid concerns, section 405/5-170 still
fails to adequately address false confessions by juveniles who are both
older and younger. than thirteen years old.278 For juveniles under the
age of thirteen, it fails to protect against false confessions by children
suspected of crimes other than murder or sexual assault.279 Children
who are suspected of committing crimes other than murder or sexual
assault could face significant penalties, and the desire to protect
children
280
from wrongful convictions should extend to additional crimes.
Not only does section 405/5-170 fall short in the crimes that it covers
for children under thirteen, but it also fails to adequately cover enough
children, namely those who are thirteen or older. With its current age
limitation, section 405/5-170 will actually apply to fewer than a hundred
children a year in Illinois. 28 1 Most juveniles suspected of committing
murder or sexual assault are thirteen years of age or older. 282 In
addition, only the children who are thirteen and older can be transferred
to the adult system, and thus, these children are at risk for more serious
punishment. 283 According to empirical research, older children do not
understand and fully appreciate their Miranda rights. 284 The cases of
Huggins,28 5 Olmetti,28 6 and Hayes287 demonstrate that even older
children are susceptible to making false confessions. While these
juveniles were fifteen, sixteen, and seventeen, respectively, they

277. Id.
278. See infra text accompanying notes 279-302 (explaining section 405/5-170's failure to
protect older and younger minors).
279. Vock, supra note 218.
280. Id.
281. Id. The Illinois Crime Authority reported that ninety-eight minors under the age of
thirteen were arrested for murder or sexual assault while 384 minors who were thirteen to sixteen
years old were arrested for murder or sexual assault. Id.
282. Id.
283. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-130 (1999 & Supp. 2001).
284. See supra Part II.E. I (examining juveniles' understanding of the Mirandawarnings).
285. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text (describing circumstances under which
Huggins falsely confessed to murder).
286. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text (discussing Olmetti's false confession to
murder).
287. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text (explaining Hayes' confession to a crime that
occurred while he was in jail).
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confessed to crimes that they did not commit, 288 and each one alleged
that he was the subject of some type of coercion by the police
officers. 289 Even though the courts summarily rejected these claims, it
is clear that something occurred during the interrogation to convince
29
these boys to confess to committing a crime. 0
The second weakness in section 405/5-170 is that it fails to exclude
confessions obtained in violation of the requirement of counsel.29 1
While an early proposal contained a provision excluding from evidence
confessions obtained 'in violation of the law, pressure from law
enforcement agencies and prosecutors led to its removal.29 2 Instead of a
per se rule requiring exclusion, a judge retains the discretion to
determine whether a confession obtained in violation of the law should
be admitted.2 93 By leaving it up to a judge to decide whether to admit
the confession, the credibility imbalance between the police and the
juvenile makes it unlikely that such a confession will be considered
involuntary and excluded.29 4 A mandatory rule excluding evidence
wrongfully obtained, however, provides a clear incentive for law
enforcement to respect the due process rights of suspects. 295 Because
law enforcement faces the difficult task of balancing due process rights
with the need to solve crimes, such an incentive is necessary to give the
right meaning. 296 Therefore, a per se rule making confessions
inadmissible if obtained in violation of the law would greatly enhance
the protection afforded under section 405/5-170.
The third significant shortcoming of section 405/5-170 is that it does
297
not actually provide counsel to minors under the age of thirteen.
Public defenders are unable to represent a juvenile suspect during an
288. See supra notes 2-9 and accompanying text (describing the recent cases of three juveniles
who falsely confessed to murder).
289. See supra notes 2-9 and accompanying text (identifying the circumstances each
confession was made under).
290. See supra notes 2-9 and accompanying text.
291. Parsons, supra note 232.
292. See supra Part III.A (explaining H.B. 3674's provision that made confessions obtained
without the safeguards required by the law inadmissible).
293. See supra note 230 (describing a legislator's comment that the lack of an inadmissibility
provision leaves enforcement of the law to judges).
294. See supra note 125 (articulating police officers' substantial credibility compared to
minors who can be poor witnesses).
295. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (explaining the need to exclude evidence
secured in violation of due process rights).
296. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) (discussing the need to exclude
evidence secured in violation of Fourth Amendment protections).
297. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-160 (2001), amended by P.A. 92-16 § 87 (codified as
amended at 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-170).
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interrogation because they are not appointed until the juvenile is
arraigned in court. 298 Because section 405/5-170 requires counsel for
certain interrogations, for many children there will be no interrogations
until a public defender is appointed. While this outcome is more
desirable than a coerced confession, it can be in the interest of the
public and the child to have an interrogation. 299 The public has an
interest in solving crimes and a confession is a valuable way for police
officers to determine what happened. 300 A juvenile who has committed
a crime needs rehabilitative services. 30 1 Therefore, the prevention of an
interrogation may not serve the public or the child.30 2 Furthermore, the
lack of a mechanism providing counsel increases the likelihood that
interrogations will take place in violation of 405/5-170.
V. PROPOSAL

Several steps can be taken to achieve the legislators' goal of
preventing false confessions by juveniles. 30 3 Changes to section 405/5170 should be made to increase the number of juveniles protected by the
law's procedural safeguard and to increase the likelihood that the law is

298. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/113-3 (2000).
299. GRISSO, supra note 155, at 201.
300. Id.
301. Meyer, supra note 264, at 1067.
302. See supra Part III.B (explaining Governor Ryan's concern that an exception was needed
for minors who could be diverted).
303. So far, the legislature has not addressed any of these concerns. Vock, supra note 218.
Michael F. McMahon, the legal counsel to the Senate President, said that the issue of who would
provide the required legal representation could be addressed during the legislature's spring
session in 2001. Id. During this session, Representative Currie proposed that $112,500 from the
Juvenile Justice Fund be used to pay for court appointed counsel in juvenile cases. H.B. 1882,
92d Gen. Assem. (Il. 2001). However, Currie's bill was still in committee at the end of the
legislature's most recent session. Daniel C. Vock, Budget Package Lacks Money for Additional
Judges, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., June 11, 2001, at 1. It appears unlikely that the legislature will
extend the requirement of counsel to juveniles who are thirteen and older. Representative Black
argued against an amendment from the House that would have raised the age of the Senate bill
from thirteen to seventeen. S.B. 730, 91st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (I11.2000) (comments of
Representative Black). Representative Black argued that the House Amendment "may endanger
the underlying Bill." Id. (comments of Rep. Black). He also said, "the underlying Bill should be
allowed a hearing on its own merits. And I think if the Amendment is not tabled the underlying
Bill may very well suffer a defeat." Id. (comments of Rep. Black). Also, the Senate sponsor of
the legislation favored the law as passed. Vock, supra note 218. Representative Hawkinson said
that the change in the age listed in the bill was fair because "[a] lot of 15-year olds have been
through the system. ... They probably know their rights backward and forward." Id.
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followed.3 4 In addition, other new procedures can help achieve the
30 5
goal of protecting juveniles during interrogations.
Because section 405/5-170 does not protect any minors thirteen or
older at all, and does not fully protect minors under the age of thirteen,
the legislature should amend the law in several ways. First, the age
indicated in the law should be increased so that all juveniles are
represented by counsel during an interrogation. 30 6 Extending the law's
procedural safeguard will ensure that great care is taken in the
interrogations of all juveniles. Second, the law should be amended to
make confessions obtained in violation of the law automatically
inadmissible. 30 7 Doing so will give police officers an incentive to
follow the law, making it more likely that juveniles will enjoy this
procedural safeguard. 30 8 Third, section 405/5-170 should be amended
to apply to all crimes committed by children under the age of thirteen,
not just murder and sexual assault. 30 9 Being convicted of any crime will
have a devastating impact on a child at such a young age, and thus
children suspected of committing crimes other than murder or sexual
assault should also receive the protection of counsel during
interrogations.
In addition to amending the statute, the legislature should develop a
way to guarantee that counsel is provided so that interrogations of these
minors can take place. This guarantee can occur in two ways. First, a
program in Chicago called First Defense Legal Aid ("First Defense")
offers a twenty-four hour hotline providing lawyers to suspects during
an interrogation. 310 The legislature should require that police officers
provide a minor with First Defense's hotline number. 3 11 This
information will help juveniles understand that they can be represented
304. See infra notes 306-09 and accompanying text (discussing possible amendments to
section 405/5-170).
305. See infra notes 310-28 and accompanying text (discussing additional measures to protect
juveniles during police interrogations).
306. See supra Part IV.B (stating that juveniles who are thirteen and older are also susceptible
to making false confessions).
307. See supra notes 291-96 and accompanying text (explaining how section 405/5-170's lack
of an inadmissibility provision is a shortcoming).
308. See supra Part IV.B (arguing that excluding evidence is the only effective way to
guarantee that police officers observe protections provided to suspects).
309. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-160 (2001), amended by P.A. 92-16 § 87 (codified as
amended at 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-170).
310. Deirdre Guthrie, Kate Walz-A Young Chicago Attorney Provides a First Defense
Against Police Abuse, MOTHER JONES, May 1, 2000, at 22, availableat 2000 WL 11682569.
311. For juveniles outside of Chicago either the program should be expanded or the law
should be altered concerning public defenders. Currently First Defense is not representing minors
outside of Chicago who fall within the law. Vock, supra note 218.
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by counsel during the interrogation. 3 12 Because a Public Defender
cannot be appointed until a suspect is arraigned,3 13 First Defense
enables indigent suspects to be represented by counsel free of charge
during an interrogation. 314 By expanding the funding and reach of First
Defense, more juveniles will be represented by counsel during an
interrogation when the child cannot otherwise afford counsel.
Second, along with expanding First Defense, the laws concerning the
appointment of public defenders should be changed. 3 15 Amending the
statute to allow for the appointment of public defenders prior to the
formal arraignment of a juvenile suspect will assist the juvenile suspect
in acquiring representation during an interrogation. If public defenders
are not appointed earlier, they should be called in when the police
charge a juvenile with a felony. 3 16 Expanding the availability of
attorneys would be an effective way to ensure that interrogations of
minors adhere to section 405/5-170.
Beyond these amendments to section 405/5-170 and the expansion of
programs like First Defense, other options are available to protect
juveniles. For example, the legislature could create a requirement that
the entire interrogation be videotaped.3 17 By taping the interrogation,
courts will have a much better understanding of the circumstances of the
interrogation and should be better able to determine whether a
318
confession was truly voluntarily given.
Another option is to require a juvenile to consult a parent before an
interrogation begins. Although a parent does little to aid juveniles
during an interrogation, 319 requiring that a child be given the
opportunity to consult with a parent may help some juveniles. 320 The
312. See supra Part II.E.I (examining studies about juveniles' lack of understanding and
appreciation of Miranda rights).
313. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/113-3 (2000 & Supp. 2001).
314. Guthrie, supra note 310.
315. Id.
316. In Chicago, State's attorneys currently are available to approve felony charges before
they are filed against juveniles. Christi Parsons & Maurice Possley, Questioning of Juveniles
Targeted in MadiganBill; Parent or Attorney Needed at Interrogation,CHI. TRIB., Jan. 27, 2000,
§ 1, at 1. Public defenders could develop a similar system so that they are brought in for the
interrogation but then do not represent the juvenile in court.
317. See supra note 202 (describing Speaker Madigan's proposal to videotape interrogations).
318. It was only through the videotape or audiotape of some interrogations that courts
recognized that juveniles had falsely confessed. See supra note 149 (explaining a California case
and an Ohio case where juveniles' confessions were thrown out because the tapes of the
confession revealed police officers' coercive tactics).
319. See supra notes 268-77 and accompanying text (analyzing how and why parents fail to
help their children during interrogations).
320. FELD, supra note 111, at 233.
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consultation should include an opportunity for the parent and child to
talk privately, and the parent should be informed of the child's Miranda
rights. 32 1 Juvenile courts should then review the interaction between the
parent and child to determine whether the parent actively represented
his or her child.322
Finally, providing better training to judges and youth law
enforcement officers can minimize the problems encountered by
juveniles.3 2 3 This training should focus on preparing judges and youth
officers to ascertain whether a minor has knowingly and intelligently
waived his or her Miranda rights. 324 Because empirical research shows
that most juveniles do not understand their rights, 325 judges and officers
should give more weight to the juvenile's age. 326 In other words, judges
should be sensitized to the dramatic correlation between a child's age
and his or her inability to comprehend Miranda rights. 327 To assist
judges, the state should be required to present evidence that
demonstrates the juvenile who confessed has a better ability than his or
328
her peers to appreciate the Miranda rights.
VI. CONCLUSION

Illinois' decision to require that juveniles be represented by counsel
during an interrogation is a positive step in addressing the problem of
false juvenile confessions. Section 405/5-170 ensures that young
children suspected of murder or sexual assault will not make an
uninformed choice of waiving their Miranda rights. While the statute
enables these children to receive much-needed guidance, the law still
falls short of fully addressing the problem of false confessions. All
minors need more protection during interrogations. Section 405/5-170
should be amended to apply to all minors under the age of eighteen. In
321. See, e.g., supra note 145 (describing other states' requirement for a meaningful
consultation).
322. See, e.g., supra note 147 (explaining a North Dakota court's holding about actual
representation by parents).
323. See GRISSO, supra note 155, at 203-04.
324. Id.
325. See supra Part II.E.1 (describing empirical evidence showing that juveniles do not
understand the Miranda warnings).
326. GRISSO, supra note 155, at 203-04. Grisso recommends that judges use the results of his
research to help them make a decision about whether a particular defendant is likely to possess
the competence to waive Miranda rights. Id. at 205.
327. Id. at 203-05.
328. This would fulfill the mandate in Miranda that the government meet its "heavy
burden ... to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege
against self-incrimination." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
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addition, other steps should be taken to prevent false confessions by
juveniles. Not only are false confessions by juveniles harmful to
communities, because crimes are not properly resolved, but
involvement with the criminal justice system can devastate an innocent
child's life forever.

